Pat Dollard

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Haartez:

Stewing in their own juices

By Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff

It took less than a week for Israel’s decision makers to change their minds entirely. Exactly the same people – who last week presented convincing reasons to justify continuing the policy of restraint in the Gaza Strip, and expressed the fear that a large-scale military action would result in an expected imbroglio – have now changed their tune completely. It is doubtful whether even Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni’s lightning visit yesterday with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Cairo will lead to a turnabout at this point. Israel is about to retaliate fiercely to Hamas’ attacks. The situation will not necessarily develop into an all-out war (at the moment, neither side appears to be interested in that), but the coming days will, so it seems, mark the end to restraint.

There are several factors behind the change in policy. The central one, simply put, is the situation on the ground: Close to 200 Katyushas, Qassam rockets and mortar shells have been fired at the Negev since Hamas said it would not renew the tahadiyeh (lull) that had expired on December 19. The response on the part of the Israel Defense Forces, at least until yesterday around noon, was the epitome of restraint. The communities situated along the border with Gaza view the events of the past few days as a demonstration of terrible weakness on Israel’s part, as a final renunciation by the state of the country’s southern periphery. And things don’t look much better from Tel Aviv or Jerusalem.

Nor can the political context be ignored. Until a short while ago, the kibbutzim of the Negev, whose members’ homes have been riddled by shrapnel from the (120-mm., Iranian-produced) mortar shells of Hamas and Islamic Jihad, were considered practically the last bastions of support for Defense Minister Ehud Barak.

And there are also practical considerations. Israeli intelligence assessments say that Hamas is interested in returning to a period of calm, but wishes to do so from a position of power, once it has imposed its conditions on Israel: first and foremost, significant improvements with regard to the opening of the border crossings into the Strip. Israel, say sources in the defense establishment, is likewise in need of a show of strength against Hamas, so it will not be dragged into the next cease-fire as the weak and frightened side in the deterrence equation.

Barak and Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi have sounded determined in recent days. There will be a military operation. Its exact timing is a question of suitable operative conditions – that is, better weather and the possibility of achieving a surprise. Barak says he will no longer consent to the “ping-pong” of provocation and response that Hamas seeks to dictate. The next cease-fire must be total and will be undertaken only after the IDF makes its strength felt in the Gaza Strip. Ashkenazi is bitter about the politicians who are vying among themselves with aggressive declarations, and portraying the caution and responsibility shown by the General Staff as cowardice.

Topple Hamas?

The various statements by Israel’s ministers reflect a good deal of confusion. Livni and Vice Premier Haim Ramon have spoken on several occasions about the need to topple the Hamas government in Gaza. Barak (and Ashkenazi, too) seems to feel that such a goal is unrealistic now. The main objective for the army is considerably more modest: exacting a significant price from Hamas, to prompt it to agree to return to the framework of the lull. The likely method for achieving this objective is not occupation of the Strip or the pursuit of every Qassam launcher. Close to the start of the operation, the army will make clear publicly that its goal is not complete cessation of the rocket fire, and that the barrages are likely to extend to even more communities as the operation proceeds. The IDF will seek to strike sites that Hamas defines as “assets,” until the organization agrees to a renewed calm.

The past two weeks have underscored one problem facing Israel: It is very difficult to prevent the launching of rockets and mortars in wintry weather. Visibility over Gaza is extremely poor in such conditions, making it hard for aircraft to identify their targets. (This problem is also currently being grappled with by those developing the Qassam interception system, which will likely not be ready for at least two more years.) Despite these limitations, it appears that the air force will still have a central role to play in any Israeli offensive. If the escalation continues, it could also develop into a ground operation. The Southern Command currently has at its disposal leading infantry brigades from Golani and the Paratroops.

Still, Israel’s leaders claim that they will avoid an all-out offensive, that occupation of Gaza is not an objective, and that Hamas is not interested in a major confrontation, either. But one has to wonder whether anyone has bothered to inform Hamas about this wonderfully rational scenario. The Palestinians have always had this annoying habit of not conforming to the nice plans the defense establishment has laid out for them.

This week, Hamas did appear to be hallucinating, likening itself to its bigger and more dangerous sister, Hezbollah. The same type of slogans, threatening proclamations, videos of militants training – and even the same type of haughty TV broadcasters smilingly reporting on actions undertaken against the Zionist enemy. But Hamas also appeared to be repeating Hezbollah’s mistakes from 2006, arrogantly believing that if the Israelis declare they don’t want to reoccupy Gaza, then it is left with nearly unlimited room to maneuver.

Even if it turns out that Hamas is right (which is highly unlikely), it is taking a tremendous gamble. A major air strike by Israel would apparently include bombardment of Hamas offices and institutions. A further deterioration to a large-scale frontal confrontation could end up costing Hamas its rule, although the IDF would surely suffer significant losses, too. Meanwhile, the tremendous importance that Hamas attaches to matters of honor and prestige cannot be discounted. A few mornings ago, while headlines in Israel reported on Hamas’ readiness to consider a new cease-fire, the organization was behind the launching of over 60 rockets and mortars, intended to settle the score for an incident the previous evening, in which paratroops killed three Hamas men out to plant explosives near the separation fence. As in the past, Hamas is prepared to risk its rule just to avoid the perception of having surrendered to Israel.

Mushir al-Masri, a Hamas parliament member in his early 30s, largely symbolizes his organization’s arrogant side. On Wednesday, Al-Masri stood before a Palestinian crowd in a mosque during the funeral for the three men killed by the paratroops. He waved an admonishing finger at Israel with the other. “We will strike them in Sderot and Ashkelon, and what comes after Sderot and after that,” he warned, echoing Hezbollah secretary general Hassan Nasrallah’s famous speech during the Second Lebanon War. The glittering gold watch on Al-Masri’s left wrist detracted a bit from the message – given the modest public image that Hamas seeks to maintain, and the economic distress of most Gazans.

On the eve of the escalation, Israel’s foreign minister journeyed to Cairo, but Livni’s visit seemed more like a PR and coordination mission than a last attempt at mediation. In Israel, the feeling is growing that Egypt would not be much opposed to a little blood being shed among Hamas. Cairo did not issue any denial following the report in the London newspaper Al-Quds Al-Arabi two days ago that Intelligence Minister Omar Suleiman had told Major General (res.) Amos Gilad that Israel needs to teach Hamas a lesson.

Relations between Egypt and the Hamas leadership in Gaza are tense and brimming with mutual resentments. Cairo is angry about the torpedoing of the Hamas-Fatah dialogue it had sponsored, and about what it saw as excessive arrogance on the part of Hamas. Gaza is angry that several Hamas officials have been imprisoned in Sinai for almost a year, and it is openly critical of Egypt. It appears that the Egyptians would prefer to let the parties stew in their own juices for a while before bringing all their weight to bear in order to attain a new cease-fire.